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nated. Bessemer Savings Bank v. Rosenbaum Grocery CO., 137 Ala.
530, 34 So. 609 (1902). See annotation 71 Am. St. Rep. 176.
Ohio has recognized contracts for the benefit of third persons,
Thompson v. Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333 (1854); Emmitt v. Brophy,
42 Ohio St. 82 (1884), but they have not done so as yet in cases
involving assumption of partnership debts. This argument was advanced
in the principal case, and it could have reasonably been the basis of the
decision had the court seen fit to so use it.
It was essential for the State of Ohio to evade the doctrine of
marshalling assets in order to share with the individual bankrupt's cred-
itors, and to prove the entire claim against the assuming partner's estate.
The evasion could have been accomplished on any one of the three
aforementioned theories; that is, upon the theory that the retiring partner
became a surety, on the theory that the retiring partner was discharged
by reason of a novation, or on the theory that the state became a third
party beneficiary by reason of the assumption agreement.
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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Maxine Martin, an actress, sued the F.I.Y. Theatre Company for
damages on two causes of action: (I) "Violation or breach of the right
of privacy;" (2) Libel. She alleged that her picture was, without her
permission, displayed by defendant in front of a burlesque house along
with other pictures of "lewd and nude burlesque actresses"; that she
was not under contract to defendant and did not intend to appear in his
or any other burlesque theatre. She further alleged that the reputation
of burlesque shows is of a low type both in her profession and in the
public mind, and that such unauthorized display of her picture injured
her in her profession. The Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County
sustained a demurrer to the first cause of action, without disposing of
the second cause, taking it for granted that plaintiff might proceed with
her action for libel.1 In sustaining the demurrer, the court, speaking
through Judge Merrick, decided, in the absence of any authority in
Ohio, that privacy was a personal and not a property right, and that "it
does not exist under any theory where the person has become prominent,
notorious or well-known so that by his very vocation or conduct he has
dedicated his life to some continued contact with the public and thereby
'Maxine Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., io Ohio 0. 338 (1938)
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has waived his right to privacy. There can be no privacy in that which
is thereby public." 2
The right of privacy as a right upon which an action may be based
is a new one, having first been asserted in i89O, and a violation thereof
first redressed by a court of last resort in 1905.' In that short period of
time, however, the subject has had a vast and varied treatment by law
review writers and a much less vast but equally varied treatment by the
courts. Since the principal case is one of first impression in Ohio, per-
haps a brief history of the right of privacy is justified.
As stated above, the right as such was not given expression until
near the end of the last century. No mention of it is made by any of
the great commentators on the Common Law. In 189o, however,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, writing for the Harvard
Law Review, very cleverly and convincingly advanced the idea that a
person's right to be let alone, to live as he pleases, free from unwarranted
publicity, is a separate and distinct legal right based on a right of property
in its widest sense, "including all possession, including all rights and
privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality."'
This provoked an almost immediate response from Mr. Herbert Spencer
Hadley in the Northwestern Review, who with equal fervor and plausi-
bility denounced any such right.' Since that time the battle between the
commentators has continued to wage, each new case calling for a new
divergence of opinion, with equally eminent authorities lined up on each
side of the controversy. To attempt to review these many comments
in this connection would be not only an arduous task but a futile one.
Suffice it to say that there is a clear conflict of opinion as to the existence
of the right either as one cognizable at law or in the courts of equity.
Prior to the first recognition of the right of privacy in the terms of
any decision, the decisions in the cases which might be said to have
involved this right were not decided on that basis but were based on a
right of property, or on a breach of an implied contract or trust.' How-
Id., p. 341"
4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., xzz Ga. 19o, So S.E. 68, io6 Am. St.
Rep. 104, z Ann. Cas. S6x, 69 L.R.A. iox (19oS).
4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 2 1 (iSgo).
3 N.W. Law Rev. i (1895).
7 Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J.Ch. 2o9 (xSzS) surgeon restrained publication of
notes taken from unpublished lectures at a hospital; Prince Albert v. Strange, i McN. &
G. z5 (1849) Lord Cottenham, in granting an injunction against reproduction and
description of etchings, recognized a right of property, but assumed that the possession of
the etchings by the defendant had "its foundation in a breach of trust, confidence, or con-
tract"; Tuck v. Priester, x9 Q.B.D. 6z9 (1887) injunction and damages for breach of
contract granted against photographer who being employbd by plaintiff to make a certain
number of prints made some for his own use and sold them; Pollard v. Photographic Co.,
40 Ch. Div. 345 (sS88) photographer who had taken lady's picture restrained from
exhibiting it on ground of beach of implied contract.
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ever, as society develops and its ramifications become more complex, it
becomes increasingly difficult to work out the protection of a person's
rights along the lines that have been recognized and applied in genera-
tions past. With the advent of instantaneous photography, and more
particularly with the introduction of the "candid camera" mania, it is
hard to see how any protection from over-zealous addicts of the art can
be afforded by means of any theory of contract.' If such protection is
to be afforded, it is not difficult to conclude that "the rights, so protected,
whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from
special trust, but are rights as against the world; and * - the prin-
ciple phich has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the
principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended
and unusual sense. The principle which protects personal writings and
any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends
this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestice or otherwise."9
The fact that the right protected is that of privacy instead of contract
is shown in an unreported case in the Supreme Court of New York."0
-In that case, the plaintiff, an actress, while playing in the Broadway
Theatre, in a r~le which required her appearance in tights, was, by
means of a flash light, photographed surreptitiously, and without her con-
sent, from one of the boxes of the theatre. Although there was no oppo-
sition to the preliminary injunction being made permanent, the court
8 "This process of implying a term in a contract, or of implying a trust (particularly
where the contract is written, and where there is no established usage or custom), is
nothing more nor less than a judicial declaration thai public morality, private justice, and
general convenience demand the recognition of such a rule, and that the publication under
similar circumstances would be considered an intolerable abuse. So long as these circum-
stances happen to present a contract upon which such a term can be engrafted by the
judicial mind, or to supply relations upon which a trust or confidence can be erected, there
may be no objection to working out the desired protection through the doctrines of contract
or of trust. But the court can hardly stop there. The narrower doctrine may have satisfied
the demands of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have
arisen without violating a contract of a special confidence; but now that modern devices
afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation
by the injured party, the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader
foundation. While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such that one's
person could seldom be taken without his consciously 'sitting' for the purpose, the law of
contract or of trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards against the improper
circulation of his portraiti but since the latest advances in photographic art have rendered
it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrine of contract and of trust are inade-
quate to support the required protection, and the law of tort must be resorted to. The
right of property in its widest sense, including all possession, including all rights and
privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that
broad basis upon which the protection which the individual demands can be rested."
Warren and Brandeis, in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, at p. 2so.
'Id.,p. 213.
'o Manola v. Stevens (i 89o).
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issued one to restrain any use being made of the picture so taken." The
only implication of a contract that could be made here is one between
the manager or owner of the Broadway Theatre and the patron, who,
upon being granted admission, impliedly agreed not to take any pictures.
Even so, what right would an entertainer have to sue on that implied
contract, unless it could be said that such implied contract arose in her
favor, that she was a third party beneficiary? Such an idea seems to the
writer to be an unconscionable stretch of our theory of contract. It
seems more plausible to assume that the right which the court was pro-
tecting was the plaintiff's right of privacy, notwithstanding the fact that
she was an actress, a public character who had dedicated her life to
some continued contract with the public.
The law concerning the right of privacy has had an interesting
development in the state of New York in both law and equity. In 1892,
the relatives of a deceased person used the right of privacy as a basis for
seeking an injunction against the erection of a statue of their deceased
ancestor. 2 The court granted the injunction on the ground that no
stranger had the right to invade the privacy which attaches to a person
when living or to her memory when dead. The court said that if a
living person were remediless and powerless to prevent the erection of
such a statue "it would certainly be a blot upon our boasted system of
jurisprudence that the courts were powerless to prevent the unwarranted
doing of things by persons who are mere volunteers, which would wound
in the most cruel manner the feelings of many a sensitive nature."'"
In the trial court no attempt was made to rely on any ancient branch
of the law; the court flatly stated that the act was an unauthorized one
which had caused, and which would continue to cause, damage. 4 The
right, however, was not upheld by the Court of Appeals." But the
judge of the appellate court was careful to say that the decision was not
to be interpreted as a denial of the existence of the right of privacy, but
placed the decision upon the ground that no "sane and reasonable per-
son" could have shrunk from the anticipation of such publicity after her
death, even though it might have proved embarrassing during her life-
time. The case, therefore, would seem to turn on a denial of jurisdiction
rather than of right.
" Case of Manola v. Stevens, cited and discussed in Schuyler v. Curtis, is N. Y.
Supp. 787, 789 •
Schuyler v. Curtis, 64 Hun. 594 (1892).
13 Id., p. 596.
4 Schuylcr v. Curtis, 27 Abb. N.C. 387 (s8g); Schuyler v. Curtis, 30 Abb. N.C.
376 (I893).
" Schuylcr v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 49 Am. St. Rep. 671, 31 L.R.A.
z86 (1895).
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The right was again recognized in another lower court case in New
York which theoretically is still the law since it has never been expressly
repudiated.16 There, the plaintiff, an actor by profession, then engaged
in the study of law, refused to give defendant publisher his permission
to print his picture along with that of another well-known actor, accom-
panied by an invitation to the readers to vote as to which was the more
popular. In spite of the plaintiff's refusal to consent, the defendant pub-
lished the picture. In granting an injunction against such publication, the
court made a statement which seems particularly applicable to the
principal case: "He might be placed in competition with a person whose
association might be peculiarly offensive as well as detrimental to him.
Such a wrong is not without its remedy. No newspaper or institution,
no matter how worthy, has the right to use the name or picture of any-
one for such a purpose without his consent."'" It could hardly be denied
that the association of pictures of a dramatic actress and a burlesque
Cartist" would be "peculiarly offensive as well as detrimental" to the
dramatic actress.
The right of privacy was, however, expressly repudiated by the
Court of Appeals in New York, in a case which has become the leading
case denying such a right.'" The court held unequivocally that a per-
son's so-called right of privacy, grounded upon the claim that he has a
right to go through life without having his picture published, whether
favorably or otherwise, does not exist in the law and is unenforceable
in equity. This decision was a reversal of the lower court which had
held that there was an invasion of the right of privacy as well as of the
right of property in the use of plaintiff's picture." The refusal of the
New York Court of Appeals to acknowledge the existence of any right
of privacy in the Roberson case led to the almost immediate enactment
of legislation giving injunctive relief and damages to one whose "name,
portrait or picture" is used for "advertising purposes" or for the "pur-
poses of trade" without his consent, and making the publisher subject
to a misdemeanor charge."0 The constitutionality of the statute was
subsequently upheld.2' In a later case, the New York court makes the
following significant statement in regard to this statute: "I think the
object had in view by the legislature was to restrain a somewhat similar
"0 Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. (N.Y.) 290 (1893).
't Id., pp. 291-292.
's Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 89 Am. St.
Rep. 828, 59 L.R.A. 478 (19oz).
1"Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 6s N.Y. Supp. 1109, 32 Misc. (N.Y.)
344 (igoo), affirmed in 71 N.Y. Supp. 876, 64 App. Div. 30 (190o).
"20 N.Y. Civil Rights Law, secs. go, Si (1903), amended (i92I).
'Rhodes v. Sperry, 193 N.Y. 223, 8S N.E. 1097, 227 Am. St. Rep. 94S, 34 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1143 (19o8); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 21o N.Y. 52, 103 N.E. 1io8,
Ann. Cas. 19z5B, 1024, L.R.A. x9x5C, 839 (913)-
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occurrence to that described in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co."2 2 So the legislature has seen fit to recognize a right which
has been denied by the courts. But the courts which have denied any
relief for breach of the right of privacy have almost uniformly said that
the function of providing such relief is a legislative and not a judicial
one.
23
Nor are the New York courts alone in denying the right. Many
others likewise deny its existence either in law24 or in equity, 2 the reason
for denying the right in equity usually being based on the absence of a
property right. There is, however, equally respectable authority which
recognizes the right as one upon which a right to injunctive relief may
be grounded, 2' and as one the violation of which gives rise to a legal
action for damages.27 The court in the Pavesich case unanimously
adopts the dissenting opinion of Judge Gray in the Roberson case and
presents what seems to the writer to be the preferable view in regard
to the right of privacy. There the plaintiff was allowed to maintain an
action for breach of the right without proof of special damages, and
without regard to property right, solely on the ground that the defendant
had breached a right of privacy which was embraced within plaintiff's
absolute rights of personal liberty and security. To the writer, such a
right seems no less worthy of protection than a lecturer's right in his
spoken words, or a writer's right in ideas expressed in a letter. And
when the right is recognized by courts as in the Pavesich case and by
legislative enactment as in New York, there must be grounds for assert-
ing the need for a recognition of the existence of the right, although as
yet it is a more or less inarticulate concept. If the right exists, there
should surely be a remedy for its violation.2"
Granting that such a right exists, and the court in the principal case
does not deny its existence, the only question remaining is whether or
not the right can be asserted in favor of an actress, whose life has been
more or less completely devoted to the public. Since it is a right, it may,
like any other right, be waived. It is generally conceded that such a
waiver has been made in case of convicted criminals, artists, candidates
Moser v. Press Publishing Co., 59 Misc. (N.Y.) 78, 8z io9 N.Y. Supp 963 (9o8).
2 3 Henry v. Cherry, 30 R.I. 13, 73 At. 97, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, x8 Ann. Cas.
Ioo6, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 99z (i9o9)i Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac.
594, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 595 (x9s).LS Id.
"'Atkinson v. Doherty, izi Mich. 372, So N.W. z85, So Am. St. Rep. 507, 46
L.R.A. 219 (I899).
" Itzkovich v. Whitaker, i15 La. 479, 39 So. 499, xz Am. St. Rep. 272, 1 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1147 (1905).
"' Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., supra; Kunz v. Allen, oz Kan. 883,
172 Pac. 53Z (1918)i Mlunden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 65z, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
' For a detailed discussion redefining the right of privacy, see 70 U.S. Law Rev. 435.
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for public office, and the like.29 The lives of such people are considered
of public interest. It is on this basis that the court in the principal case
denies the existence of the right in favor of the plaintiff. There is, how-
ever, a restriction generally placed on the right of free publication of
pictures and comments concerning public characters. The publication
must be. fair and reasonable.3" "The right of privacy may be waived
either expressly or by implication * * * ; but a waiver authorizes an
invasion of the right only to such an extent as is necessarily implied from
the purpose for which the waiver is made."'"
An actress may easily be said to have waived her right of privacy
for some purposes. She is naturally interested in having her picture
legitimately advertised; she wants the public to be interested in her, to
patronize the theatres and the productions in which she is appearing.
Her success, both financially and as an actress, depends on that patron-
age. Were she under contract to the owner of the burlesque house to
appear in his theatre, she could have no complaint to the posting of the
picture, despite the fact that it was displayed with other pictures of "lewd
and nude burlesque actresses." Her contract would imply a waiver of
any such complaint. But, in the absence of any contract, the publishing
is an unauthorized invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy, an invasion
outside the scope of her implied waiver and intended solely as a financial
benefit to defendant. It could scarcely be said without putting the tongue
in the cheek, that such an invasion is not injurious to one in the plaintiff's
position. One whose life has been devoted to the legitimate theatre can
hardly expect to maintain a reputation along that line if her name is to
be associated, by reason of an unauthorized act, with the burlesque
boards. The fact that plaintiff has impliedly consented to the publication
of her picture by one class, those with whom she is associated, does not
authorize an invasion by another class with whom she has never had,
and probably hopes never to have, any connection. Adopting this view,
then, the court could have reached a more liberal, and, in the opinion
of the writer, preferable decision. It must be recognized, however, that
the ruling of the principal case is supported by respectable authority, and
is justifiable in that light. But in the light of the contrary authority and
the statutes recognizing the right of privacy, the court could well have
followed this apparent trend and could have granted the plaintiff the
relief prayed for. Perhaps, however, when the case comes up on appeal
in the near future, the Court of Appeals may see fit to recognize the
right in this case. JAMEs F. BELL, JR.
- Pavesic v. New England Mat. L. Ins. Co., supra; Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash.
61S, io Pac. x3z2, L.R.A. 19i6A, 739-
o Pavesckh v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., supra.1 4 Id., p. 191.
